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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab

EDITH tvf.

LANGLOIS~

Plaintiff and Appel!ant,
Case No.

vs.
NORMAN T.

9054

REES~

Defendant and Respondent.

Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff and appellant will be referred to as plaintiff
or in her own na.rne ~ and the defendant and respondent wilt
be referred to as defendant or in his own name.

All italics are ours.
The plaintiff, Edith M. Langlois~ brought this action
against Norman T. Rees for injuries she sustained when struck
by an automobile driven by the defendant. The accident oc-

3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cur red on the 25th day of March~ 195-8, at about 4:30 p.m~
Mr~~·-·La.ngl~1s was walking east across an urUnarked crosswalk
from the Vlt'est side of State Street to the east, on the south side
of the inter section of First A venue.

In her complaint) the plaintiff complained the defendant
was negligent in (a) failure to yield the right-of-wayt (b)
traveling too f a5 t for existing conditions, (c) f a:i 1ure to have
his automobile under control, and (d) fail u.re to keep a proper

lookout.
The de£ en dant answer edt denying negligence and claimed

that the injuries 'v ere contributed to by the negligence of the
plaintiff.

The lssu~s c~eated by the pleadings and the pretrial order
as amended were as follo,vs: The plaintiff claimed defendant

'vas negligent in (a.) failu~e to ~iel~ right-of-wayt (b) traveling too fast for existing conditions~ (c) failur~ to keep his
car under contio1 so as to a void striking plaintiff, (d) £ail ure
to keep a proper lookout) (e) fai Iure to keep his windshiel~
properly clear so he could see wh~1.t was on the highway to be
seen~ and (f) plain tiii 1s entitled to recover on the last clear
chance doctrine+ Dcfendanfs cont~tions were that plaintiff
(a) failed to yield the right-of-way to defendant and (b)
failed to kcc p a proper lookout, and cited Section 41-6-79)
subsections (a) and (c), U.C.A~ 1953, and defendant denied
he was negligent.
The case came on for trial before a jury on the 3rd and
4th days of March, 1959. Exhibit 1~ a map
drawn

of the intersection

by an engineer, was admitted in evidence, and Exhibits

2~ · 3 ~ 4, and 5 ~ all pictures of the intersection, \v e rc admitted.

4
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The court refused to give the following instructions te·
quested by plain tiff:
N (). 1, plain tiff~ s request that the court hold defendant ne gligent as a matter of law, and direct a verdict fo.r the plaintiff.

No.2
The mere fact that the plaintiff was not in the
marked crosswalk at the time she was struck by defendanfs automobile will not relieve the defendant
from lia hili ty unless she was guilty of other con tr i butory negligence that proximately resulted in her inJUrtes+
And the following h.vo instructions from JI FU:
It is the duty of the driver of an automobile to yield
the right~of-way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway
'vi thin any tnar ked crosswalk, or \Vi thin aq. y crosS·
walk even if it is not marked at the end of any block+
Failure to so yield the right·of.way to a pedestrian
in any such crosswalk would constitute negligence.
JIFU 20.6~

As to locality on a. roadway such as that involved
in this case) these £actors enter in to consideration o £
the question of what conduct is required of a pedestrian
in the exercise of ordinary care in crossing a high Vtray.
1. If he crosses within a marked cross"valk, or at an
intersection v.,r i thin a crosswalk) whether mar ked or
not, tbc lav.r requires the driver of all vehicles to yield
the right-of -way to him.

2. If he crosses at any other place~ the lavl requires
him to yield the right-of.way to all vehicles on the
roadway so near as to constitute an immediate hazard,
although this req uiretnent does not relieve rhc driver
of a vehicle from the duty to ex ere is e ordinary care
for the safety of any pedestrian upon a roadway~

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3. The amount of caution recjuired to constitute
ordinarv care increases as does the danger that a. r.e.asonab ly. prudent person, in like position, would a.pprehend in the situation~ For example~ heavy veht~lar
traffic fast traffic poor visibility ob struc:tions to vtew.,
v.ret p~vement-a~y of these or 'any other perceivable
factor increasing the hazard, increases the amount of
caution \Vhich an ordinary prudent person would use.

JIFU 20.8.
No.5
It is not enough that a driver be able to stop within
the range of his vis ion or that he use diligence to stop
after discerning an object. The rule makes no allowance
for delay in action. He must, on pe[il of legal· negligence, so drive that he can actually discover an object.,
perform· the necessary acts necessary to stopping, and
bring the car to a comp tete halt within such range if
necessary to avoid collision with and injury to others
on the highway. If his vision is obscured by sno·w,
sleet or fog on the windshield or windows so that he
cannot see the required distance ahead, or to the side
.as the case rna y bet he mustt \vithin such distance from
the point of such lack of vision~ bring his car to such
control that he can stop immediately, and if he cannot
then see~ should stop.-72 A.L.R. 1352.
~rhe following are instructions of the court pertinent to

plain tiff's claims in this case:

NoL 4
It was the duty of defendant Norman T~ Rees to
use reasonable care under the circumstances of this
cJ.se in drjving his automobile to avoid danger to him~
self and others and to observe and be a ware of the
condition of the highway, traffic thereon and other
existing. conditions an~ particularly with respect to
the parttculars of neghgence charged by the plaintiff~
6
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he was obliged to observe due care in a 11 respects as
to the fol Jowing:

(a) Not to travel too fast for existing conditions.
(b) To keep his car under reasonable~ safe and
proper control+
(c) T') keep a lookout for conditions rea.son.a bl y to
be anticipated ahead of him.

(q) To keep his windshield reasonably clear so that
he (auld 5ee what ~vas on the highway to be seen.
With. respect to the allegation that defendant failed
to yield the right-of-way~ the court instructs you that
that allegation is not a pplica bl e bee ause of an ins truetion in that regard \vhich will be giv~n to you.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence
that defendant \\'aS negligent in one or more of the
foregoing fou.r particulars ( right.of-way being exclud·
ed) and that such negligence vtas the proximate cause of
the accident and of plaintiffs injuries then un1ess you
find also that plaintiff is barred from recovering from
defendant because of her contributory negligence~ upon
which subject you will also be instructed, your ver diet
shall be for the plaintiH and against the de£ endant.

No . 6
At the time of this accident, one of the la\vs of Utah read
as follows:
~ ~ Behveen

adjacent 1n te rsections at which traffic contro l signals arc in operation) pedestrians shall not cross
at any place except in a marked crosswalk.t!
Under this law, plaintiff \vas prohibited from crossing State Street at any point other than the marked
crosswalk on the north side of the inter section of State
Street and First Avenue., and since it is admitted that
she did not attempt to u.se the rn arked crosswalk at
7
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that point~ the court rules that she violated th~ above
la"\\,. and that such .a violation constituted neghgence ·

No.7
U tab 1avl requires that a pedestrian crossing the
street at a point other than vii thin a marke? cross~alk
or within an unmarked crosswalk at an 1ntersect1on,
1nust yield the right·of-w.ay to all automobiles a.p~
proaching so near as to constitute an immediate hazard.
The parties have stipulated and agreed that at the
point where plaintiff was crossing~ there was no marked
cross"i;:\ralk. This court instructs you that the place where
pia in tiff \\-·as attempting to cross State Street was not
~ an un1n a r ked eros swal k at an intersection,'· as those
t eons are used in Utah law, and theret"ore plainti.H
was required to yield the right-of-way to defendant's
approaching automobile. Therefore, if you find that
defendanfs automobile was so near as to constitute
·an immediate hazard and that the plaintiff did not
yield the right-of-way, she was negligent.
1;

No.8
Regardless of the court! s instruction that plain tiff
was guilty of negligence in crossing \vhere she did
and regardless of whether you sha.I l determine that
she was negligent ln failing to yield the right--of-way
to clefen dant ~ if you do so determine, the court instructs
you that before either or both of such acts of negligence wi 11 bar plaintiff from recovering her damages
from defendant you must fir5t .6nd that either one or
both of such acts of negligence was a. proximate~ con~

tributory cause of the accident and of plaintiff) s Jn.
JUnes.

If you Ji nd this issue against defend ant and for the
plaintiff .and if you also shall have found against the
defendant a.nd for the plaintiff with respect to the
8
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allegations of defendanfs negligence then you may
assess plain tiff~ s damages un de.r the instructions to
be given you in that regard.
If you find the issue of
against the plain tiff and £or
yet be required to determine
tiff's contributory negligence
the rules of what is knov.rn in
Chance Rule~

contributory negl.lgence
the defendant you v.,T ill
and find \vhether plainis excused by reason of
the lavl as the Last Clear

Instruct ion No. 9 was the instruction as to the 1as t clear

chance. We are not including K o. 1 ~ 2) 3, and 5, nor the stock
ins t.tuction.s.

The case was submitted to the jury and they returned a
verdict of no cause of action. Thereafter, the plaintiff made a
motion for new trial \Vhich was by the court denied on April 6,

1959, and thereafter~ within the time required by lavl~ the
plaintiff filed her appeal to the Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
First A venue intersects ~'ith North State Street but does
not cross State Street. First Avenue from curb to curb is fiftyeight feet, six inches wide. The north and south traffic on State
Street is divided by double lines, and there are

t\\/0

lanes for

the north bound t raHic and two lanes for the southbound traffic.
There is a marked pedestrian crossing on the north side of the
intersection crossing State Strc et~ and there is a sign on the
northeast corner of State ~treet~ facing north and south, marked
~~pedestrian lane4" The sidewalk on the south side of first

Avenue is tv.felve feet v.,T ide and there is not a tnar ked cros_sing
at that point to the west side of State Street. 1~here was no
9
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sign or barrier. on either side indicating that a person ~hould
. not cross at that point (see ex:hibi ts) There is a stop slgn on
First Avenue on the northeast corner of the intersection fot
traffic going west on First Avenue (see Exhibit l, a map of
' the ar~a, and Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 5, pictures of the area)~
There ~re traffic control signals at South Temple and State
Street and at North T etn pte and State Street.
7

The accident occurred while the plaintiff was crossing
State Street in the unmarked crosswalk on the south side of
the in tersec ti on of First Avenue and State St [ect.
The plaintiff in this case is a widow+ She 'A-·as eighty-four
years of age. at the time of the accident. She lived at the Gate-

way Apartments at 28 North State Street and had lived there
for eleven years (R. 57).
The plaintiff knew there was a crosswalk on the north
side of the street and knew that it had painted lines and knew

that it was by the stores (R. 68) . She knew that people used
the south era sswalk. Almost everybody used it, and this had
been going on for the eleven years she had lived there (R~ 56,
59, 60, and 69) .

On the day of the
\vent to the

accident~

March 25, 1958, the plaintiff

L.D.S. Temple early in the morning. The weather

was nice when she went but it v~·a.s raining and sno\Ving when
she started home about 4:00 p.m. She walked up through the
general offices of the Mutual and through the little alley
onto the west sidewalk of State Street She turned south and
walked just beyond the post which is a little north of the
north boundary of the unmarked south crossing. across State
Street (R. 58-61).
10
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She looked up and down to see if there were any cars, and
there weren't any. There was no car coming down First Avenue

that had entered the intersection and so she decided to cross+
She started to go across and she was knocked down and knocked
unconscous (R. 59). She \vas walking straight east toward

the sidewalk (R .61) ~
Norman T. Rees~ the defendant, lived at 402 First Avenue
and was twenty~.fi ve years old and single. He had driven a car

since he was eighteen years old and had a Utah driver~ s lieens e
restricted to wearing glasses when he drove (R. 30).
On March 25, 1958~ the day of the accident~ he had a

two-door green Champion 19 50 Studebaker that had been
driven 70,000 to 80,000 miles. He drove west on First Avenue
in order to get to 3 5 Richards Street where he worked. He

testified that visibility

\Vas poor and the snow was plastering

on the windshield) a v,oet~ heavy snow

(R. 34). His right front

window and left front window 'vere fogged. He could only
see through the s~·eep of the windshield wiper on the windshield ( R. 38) . He could see 5traigh t ahead but he had cliff icul ty
seeing to the left or right. As he went down First Avenue
approaching State Street., he was in the lane next to the center.
He knew about the stop sjgn on State Street and First Avenue

(R. 35) ~
He stopped at the

stop sign, according to his testimony,

and after looking to the north and south and there vlas no
traffic, made his turn. He said he made a normal left hand
turn ( R. 36) . Defendant Rees didn~ t know exactly what part

of the street Mrs. Langlois~ the plaintiff, was in~ By that, he
meant how far south she was. He said she \vas three or four
11
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feet from the curb when he first saw her and that she was
\valking in an easterly direction (R. 36-3 7). He said Mrs.

Langlois ~T as walking about medium speed.
On the map he made ~ mark that would be about forty
feet from v.rhere he claimed \vas the point of impact~ There
he m.ade the turn~ However, he said he didn't see her until
he was about ten or tw·elve feet from her. 1\.s he was going
around the turn onto State Street, he was unable to see Mrsr
Langlois (R. 47). He first saw her about three or four feet
east of..... the west curb and she was hit fowteen feet west of the
east curb. He .figured he was going ten or fifteen miles per
hour as he started to 1nake the turn. The defendant admitted

that in his deposition he said he struck her about even with
the south side~·alk of First Avenue. The defendant was very
familiar with the inter$ection and he had seen people go across
the unmarked crosswalk. However, he said they were jaywalk~

ing (R. 51).
He testified tha·t Mrs. Langlois had a piece of newspaper
over her head to protect herself from the snow and that from
the time he first sa\\· her when she was three or four feet
from the curb~ he never took his eyes off her and that she
didn~t turn her head~ change her pace, or stop (R. 52). He

. was doing everything he could to stop his car ( R~ 48 and 53) ~
and when he stopped she was lying down with her head to the
south and her feet to the north .
He picked up the newspaper and put it in his car. However~ he didn~t discuss that with the officer or show it to him

(R. 55).
12
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He did not recall looking across the street before he

made his move from the stop sign and he didn't recall seeing
the plain tiff before she 1eft the sidewalk and he di dn t believe
j

cllat he honked his horn (R. SG-57).
0 .ffice r Proctor Lescoe "'-as a police officer and he had been
for two years~ On that date he \Vas assigned to accident investigation (R. 15). He arrived at the intersection at 1:39 p.m.
and when he arrived he s a~r the de£ endant s automobile and
T

Mrs. Langlois and the po 1ice ambulance+ He tcs tified that it
was snowing a wet snow. He measured where Mrs. Langlois
was, and she v./as twelve feet south of t!}.e south edge of the

extended sidewa~k and the car was e]cven feet (R. 15 and 16).
H c tal ked to the de£ endant in the police ca.r and the

defendant told him his estimate of his speed as he made his left
turn was fifteen miles per hour~ and that he first observed the
pedestrian thirty to forty feet· away, and that the impact speed
a.t the time of the collision 'vas five to ten miles per hour. His
general statement to Mr ~ Lescoe was:

Lii was stopped at the stop sign on First Avenue and
State. I 1ooked both ~lays; no cars were coming so I
made a left turn. Didn't see her until 1 v.ras almost on
top of her. There 1A as some frost on my right front
window.n (R.17) "
1

According to the rna P~ l\1r. Lesco e said that Mrs. Langlois
,vas about fourteen feet east of the west curb of State Street.
On cross examination by defendant's counsel, 1V1r. Lescoe stated

that he didn ~ t find anything at the scene of the accident in dieating that defendant's estimate of his speed \Vas not proper.
Mr. Lescoe said that if the defendant sa\V the plain tiff three

13
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or four feet away and was going fi £teen mil cs per hour, he
couldn't have reduced his speed to five or ten ~_iles per hour
in three or four feet. He said that. at fifteen miles per hour it
v.:ould take tv.renty-five to thirty feet to stopt and at five miles
per hour jt would take· seven feet or probably ten feet on wet

pavement (R. 19~24).

l.Vlr. Lescoe said that according to his measurements that
day she v.-~as about twelve feet west of the east curb line~ but
according to Exhibit 1 (the engineer's dra\ving) it would be
fourteen feet west (R. 19).
Mrs. Langlois was taken by the ambulance over to the
Clinic and Dr. Crockett wouldn! t let her in. He said she would
have to go to the hospitaL She passed out and didn't remember
anything until she was in bed in the L~D. S. Hos pita I~ where
she stayed for about three days. They took x.ra.ys and put on

a cast.
She used crutches for a few days and then a cane. She was
bruised all ove:r -(R. 60r62). She was sore aod her ankle

pruned

some and she had to stay in bed a good deal of the time for a
few days. Her daughter stayed with her for several weeks. She
kept the cast on durjng that time and us.ed a cane for about

three months.
She went to England in August~ 1958~ and in England
she seemed to get_ along pretty well (R~ 63-64).
She didn't recaU having a newspaper over her head.
Dr~

Thomas E. Bauman~ an orthopedic surgeon with the
Salt Lake Clinic~ testified that he sa\v Mrs. Langlois at the
L.D.S. Hospital on March 25~ 1958~ and he examined her.
14
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She had a fracture of the lateral malleolus and she was treated
with a plaster cast and bed rest for dizziness. She had a short

leg cast put on and wore it until May, 1958, when it was taken

off and her recovery v..·as very satisfactory ( R. 30~ 33) .

THE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The plaintiff makes the following assignments of error:
1. The verdict of the jury \vas contrary to the great v.:eight

of the evidence and was unsupported by the evidence.
2. The Court erred in not directing the

jury to return a

verdict in favor of the plai_ntiff and against the defendant.

3. The Court erred in denying plaintiffs motion for: nev..r
trial'.
4. The Court erred in refusing to give the jury plaintiffs
requested Instruction No. 2 and JIFlJ 20.6 and 20.8.

5. The Court erred in its failure a.n d refusal to give p 1aintiffs requested Instruction No. 5.
6. The Court erred in its failure to include

in Instruction

No . 4 ·that the defendant failed to yield the right~of.way to
plaintiff.

7 The Court erred in giving Instruction No.
r

6~

8. The Court erred in giving Instruction No. 7.

The plaintiff relies upon each of the assignments of error
set forth above and will consider the a ssi gnmen ts in the following argum en t consisting of two dlfferent points. Assignment
of error No. 3, of course, is included in each of the two argu·
15
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men ts as there vias su:fficien t error to justify the granting of a
new trial under ea,h point

POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY,
IN INSTRUCTIONS NO. 6 AND 7l THAT THE PLAIN'TIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AS A !VIATTER OF LAW~ AND
ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFFjS REQUESTED

INSTRUCTION NO. 2, AND INCLUDING JlFU 20.6 AND
20.8~

Assignments of Error 4l 6, 7, and 8.

The Court based these instructions upon Section 41-6A 79l
Utah Code Annotated 19 53:
·
~~Pedestrians

shall yield right-of-way.-

(a) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any
point other tb an within a marked crosswalk or within
an unmarked crosswa]k at an intersection shall yield
the right -of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
(c) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic
control signals are in operation pedestrians shall not
cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk."
The question imm edi a tel v arises: Does the. intersection
of First A venue and State Stree; ~ef:Jliz £i6tr~[fntersection ? To

decide this

question~ we will

which defines

~'intersection~~

~ ~ 41· 6· B.

:first look to our own statute
and

~~cross\valk. ~~

In tersection-.-----crossw a lk .-

(a) ~~Intersection.,
1) The a rea embraced within
the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines,
j

(
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or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two highways which join one another at, or
approximately at) right angles~ or the area within which
vehicles. traveling upon different highways joining at
any other angle in conflict.
That part of a roadway at an in~
te rsection included within the connections of the Iateral
lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway
measured £rom the curbs~ or in the absence of curbs)
from the edges of the traversab Ie roadway; any portion
of a roadway at an intersection or elsewhere distinctly
indicated for pedestrian crossing by 1ines or other markings on the surface~ ~

(b)

·~crosswalk.''

1

Under that definition there can be no doubt that it is an
intersection+ The fact that First Avenue stops at State Street

and does not cross beyond State Street would not change the

'Situation. 5 American Jurisprudence, Sec. 288 ~ p. 662:
!tThe 'veight of authority is to the effect that an
~intersection within the meaning of traffic statutes or
regulations .arises from the meeting of one street with
another at an angle, a 1though one of the streets stops
at and does not cross the other. Other cases require
the streets to eros s in order that they shall be considered intersecting streets ... 31 A.L.R. 488 ( annotation) . Junction of two streets rna y form a high way
intersection with a. traffic statute or regulation, although
one of them extends only to and not beyond the other
is supported by the 1\~"eight of authorityrn 78 A.L~R.
1198-supplemental to 31 A.L.R. 488~ holds the same.
t

It is ~dmitted that at the time of the accident there ~ras
a traffic control signal working at North Temple and State
Street and also at South Temple and State Street. If North
Temple and State Street and South T em pie and State Street,
17
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where there are traffic control lights~ are adjacent intersections~
then perhaps the lower Court would haiie been right.

The v.rord "ad jacenf is relative ~ n meaning~ and its con·
s t ruction is de terrnined by the con text in v.,· h ich it is used in
a statute. Grudnosky v. Bislo\\:, 88 K.\Xl. 2nd 847 (Minn.
1943).
j

State ex reL Dryman v. "District Court of Ninth Judicial
District, Supreme Court of Montana~ 1954;> 276 P(2d) 969.
This Court cited vlith approval the definition of ''adjacent''
from 1 C.J~S·;> pp. 1464-1465:
"Th c ~To rd ·ad jacenf is of Latin derivation from
'ad-jaceo'~ to lie at, or near. It has been said that the
wo.rd has no arbitrary meaning or defi.ni tion) but that
the term is a relative and not a definite and abso!ute
one, and the exact meaning of ·w hichJ in any particular ·
case, is determinable principally by the c:ontat in which
it is used, the facts and ci rrums ta nces of the case, the
subject tnatter to which it is applicd;t or the intent of
the Legislature or the parti cs, and the word is usually
to be given a broad sub stan ti al construct io·n and not
Iim ited to the literal meaning as defined by 1exicoggr.aphers. '"
1

"AdjacenfJ is defined in Petitioners of &hool District
N(). 9) Caddo County: v~ Jones~ District Judge~ et al~~ Okla~
homa, 1919, 1.40 P(2d) 922~ Therein the definition of the

term) as contained in Webster's Dictionary of Synonytns, is
quoted with approval as follows:
nAdjacent does not always imply actual contact, but
it does not admit of any thing of the same kind between;
thus) adjacent 1ots are in con tact~ but adjacent houses
may or may not bf:\"
18
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This definition was approved by City of Ada v. ·whitaker et al

+)

212 P ( 2d) 482 (Okla. 1949) ~

The only sensible
statute~

\llt1

ay to define Hadjacent" in the Utah

supra, would be the same as in the two Oklahoma

cases. Thus~ adjacent intersections would not admit of another

in te rsectio n behv een th etrL
The argwnent tnight be advanced that if this construction
is adopted~ great inconvenience ~~ould be encountered by the
motorists being obJiged to recognize unmarked crosswalks

such as the one in this case. But)

on the other hand) if the Court

should hold adjacent meant

near~''

!t

untold- confusion

and

hardships to the pedestrian would be the result. ~ . Near'' is a
generic term and there are streets in this city, in fact all over
state~

where the traffic signals are all the vi ay from three
blocks to a mile apart and the road is intersected by many
streets, none having marked cross\valks. The pedestrian would
have to walk blocks in order to cross the road. Under the

the

~

adjacent,'' as set out by
the 0 klahom a courts, it would be a comparatively slm ple 111 at tcr
for the City to place signs at the cross v.ralks of the intersections

sensible construction of the 'vord

4

they did not wish the pc destria n to cross. See Sections 41·6-20,
41-6-21, and 41-6-22, ULC.A. 1953.
It is safe to assume that the law \vas originally written
to cover instances like Main Street betv{een ti .irs t and Second
South) Second South and Third Sou th;t etc.
The south sidewalk on First Avenue extends level to State
Street J an actual invitation for pedestrians to eros s there. The
conditions are exactly similar to those on the north side, ext ept
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as to the sign and the painted lines. There is no sign there
dir~ting pedestrians not to cross. The place where plaintiff
crossed was an u.n tnar ked eros sv..'"a lk as defined by Section
11-6-8~

supra.

The Court, in Instruction No. 6, instructed the jury that
the plaintiff ~Tas negligent as a matter of la¥.r for walking
"\vhere she did+ In Instruction No. 7~ the Court said she was.

obliged to yield the right~of-way to defendant's approaching
au tomo bile. In vi e~T of those two instructions, it was impossible
for the plaintiff to recover. The first paragraph of In.,truction
No. 8 does not help~
~·Regardless

of the court's instruction that plaintiff
v.,r as guilty of negligence in crossing where she did and
regard 1ess of whether you shall determine that she
was negJigent in faiJing to yield the right-of-way to
defendant~ if you do so determine, the court instructs
you that before either or both of such acts of negligence
VtJT i I l bar plain tiff from rccove ring her damages from
defendant you must first .find that either one or both of
such acts of negllgence was a proximate~ contributory
cause of the accident and of plaintiff's injuries.n
The first th.ing the jury \VOu]d say is that if she hadn't
been in the position which the Court said \vas negligent anJ
unla\vful, the accident never would have happened~
The Court, s error in giving Instructions No. 6 and 7 ~ and

failing to give plaintiffs requested instructions as set forth in
the statement of the case constituted prejudicial error.
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POINT II.
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS CONTRARY TO
THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE
COURT ERRED lN I\iOT DIRECTING THE JURY TO
RETURN A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF.
Assignments of Error

1~

2, 3~ 4~ and 5.

If the plain tiH 's contention is correct in Point I~ then she
was crossing State Street in an unmarked cross,valk, as defined

by subdivision (b), Section 41-6-8, U .C.A~ 19 53.

In that
event, the p1ai ntiff had the right·Of way over the de£ en dan t
who was making his left turn south on State Street.
w

Subdivision

(a)~

Section 41-6w 78, U.C.A. 1953:

~·Pedestrians'

right-of-way. - (a) When trafficcontrol signals are not in place or not in operation
the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-wayl
slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield~ to
a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a cross"'ralk
\\~hen the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway
upon which the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is approaching so clos ely from the oppo site half
of the road\vay as to be in danger, but no pedestrian
shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety
and walk or run into the path of a vehicle ~· hich is
so close that l t is impossible for the driver to yicl d.
This provision shall not apply under the conditions
stated in 41-6-78 (b) .n

Coombs

v+ Perry, 2

Utah 389, 275 P(2d) 680

Mingus v. Olsson 114 Utah 505, 201 P (2d) 495
1

Smith v. BennettJ 1 Utah 2nd 224, 265 P (2d) 101
21
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T'he writers are mindfu] of the pedestrian's obligations.

The pedestrian's right~of~way is not absolute. 1'he pedestrian
has a right-o£-v.,.·ay, but not a right to self-jnflictcd mayhem for
\V hich the defendant can be held liable~ M1ngus v. Olsson,
supra.
Where a pedestrian failed to look, or having looked,

failed to see \V hat he should have seen and paid heed to, the
cas cs ho] J is negligence! but by the same ~ok en the motorist
has some duties too. As was so aptly said in Jurlsch v+ Puget
Tranportation Co.) Supreme Court of Washingtor:J 1927, 25R
Pac. 39:
:t

·"If the conceded right of way means anything at
all, it puts the nece5sity of continuous observation and
avoidance of injury upon the driver of the automobile
when approaching a crossing, just as the necessity of
the case puts tn e sam c higher degree of care upon the
pedestrian at other places than at crossings. ~
j

Crossings are there especially for pedestrians~ and motorists
in approaching them must bear this in mind. The driver of
an a utomobi!e should always be a ware of the fact that pedes~
trians may be crossing a street at intersections and that pedestrians so crossing the street are en tit 1eJ to the right -of-way
r

· To conclusively show that the defendant Vrt as guilty of
negligence in this case and th.a t the plain tiff was free £rom
contributory negligence~ let us look at the record. The plaintiff~ eighty-four years of age at that time~ stopped on the-. \Vest
curb of State Street~ immediate Iy facing the crosswalk on the
south side of the intersection of State Street and First Avenue.
She looked up and down to see if there were any cars. There
7
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weren~t

any. There was no car coming down First Avenue

that had entered the intersection and so she decided to cross.

The plaintiff had a right to presume that a motorist who might
come down First Avenue would stop at the stop sign~ and
before making his left hand tu.tn, exercise due care to ascertain
tbat such movement could be made with reasonable safety.
She walked a few steps straight east tov.lard the south sidewalk

of First Avenue and was struck. That is all she remembered.
It is undisputed that there was a heavy, wet snowstorm
at the time. The defendant was driving west on First Avenue~
and jntended turning south on State Street~ His visibility was
poor and the snow \vas plastering on the windshield (R. 34).
His right front window and his left fran t window ~rer e fogged~
He could only .see through the sweep of the windshield wiper
(R~

38). He could see straight ahead, but couldn~t see to the
left or right. He stopped at the stop sign~ according to his
testimony, and after looking to the north and south, as he said,
and there was no traffic, made a normal left hand turn (R. 36)
If he was facing west~ he would have had great difficulty seeing
any appreciable distance to the north or to the south. He could
only see practically straight in front of ~im.
+

The defendant first told officer Lescoe that he saw Mrs.
Langlois thirty or forty feet fro ~n the paint of impact~ Then at
the trial he .said that he sa\v her ten or twelve feet~

In his

general statement to officer Lescoe, he said he didn't see her
until he was prac:tica ll y on top of her. How ever, at the trial,
he was very sure that he first saw her three to four feet east

of the west curb+ There is no questlon that Mrs. Lang lois \Vas
struck fourteen feet east of the west curb.
..,
2)
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This eighty-four-year-old woman walked from ten to
eleven feet from the point defendant first saw her to the point
v,rhere she · was struck. According to one part of defendant's
testimony~ that he saw her ten or eleven feet away, then his
car had to be going the sarne s.peed as the plain tiff~ If such
VttTere the case) he could have stopped. Obviously, his statement
in that regard is VY' rong. If the de£ endant, as is claimed~ was
watching Mrs+ Langlois walking across the street with a paper
o¥·er her head from three feet from the west curb to the point
where she vl as s true k fourteen feet east of the curb, it would
clear1y appear that he had hvo choices to make. First, he could
have cut over to the west side of State Street and missed her.
Se:eond~

he could have stopped. Ha.d the de£ endant~ a.s he once

told the officer seen the plaintiff thirty or forty feet away, he
l

could have stopped his car unless he was speeding. In either
event, he would have been negligent.

T h c third a 1ternative is that the defendant, either on
account of inattention on his part or on account of the snow
on the v.,·indshield and the fog on the windows) failed to see
the plaintiff. He proceeded to make the left hand tum and
was~ as

he said in another part of his testimony"j right on top
of her before he saw her. At any rate) he knocked or pushed
Mrs. Lang lois a distance of eleven or twelve feet south~ ·where
she was picked up~

Any one of the above alternatives demonstrates the clefen dan t s negligence beyond a peradventure of a doubt. The
=

defendant didn't sound any warning, yet he knew or should
. have known that his vision \v a.s obscured and someone might
be on the cross"v a lk. 1~he la v../ is cor recti y stated in pl a.in tiff's
24
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taken from 72 A.L.R~ 1352. A moh) rist shou 1d be able to stop within the range of his vision.

requested Instruction No.

5~

nlf his vision is obscured by snow, sleet at fog on
the windshield or windows so that he cannot see the
required distance ahead~ or to the side a.s the case rna y
be, he must~ within such distance from the point of
such 1ack of vision~ btin g his car to such control that

he can stop lmmediateJy, and if he cannot then see,
should stop ~ ~
r

The cases on automobile and ped~strian are legion and
many cases have gone so far as to indicate that a pedestrian
should anticipate almost anything that a careless motorist
might do. Such is not the law here nor should it be. Was Mrs.
Lang! ois~ the plain tiff here~ required to anticipate that someone
comtng west on First A venue and State Street~ with his vision
obscured by snow and fog on vvi.ndshield and windo,vs, would .
carelessly and negligently run into her?

Mrs. Langlois was not contributorily negligent A recent
Personal Injury N ev,rsl etter reviewed, as they said, ~~two beau ti-

fully written opinions·'' from Michigan in which the Court
held PEDESTRIAN IS NOT A ~LEGAL SITTING DUCK.''
4

The Court said:

test of con tr lbutory negligence is not \v h ether
the plaintiff did al] that he concei va bly could have
done or even all that. in retrospect~ it is obvious he
shouj d have don e. Plaintiff did fail to make a proper
estimate of defenda..nfs proximity through the windov..rs
of the daub Jc- par ked car. Plain tifi did fail to anti ci pate
defendant's s'werve into the other side of the street.
Plain tiff did fail to make a correct decision on the
direction from which his greatest danger might come.
But~ asked th€ court, 'Can we really say that these
~~The
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failures .of judgment \vere such a.s to be undebatably
outside the realm of conduct of the ordinarily- prudent
person ? . . . As the power and acce tera tion of the
automobile have increased the effectiveness of the
'
evasive ac t.i on of the pedestrian
has d eel ined. ~
This
Court should not leave the pedestrian a legal sitt_ing
duck.:> " Ware v. Nelson, 88 NW 2nd 524 (M1ch.
1958) ~
r

•

The decis1on in the Ware case was tendered on March 5, 1958.

A day earlier, the Michigan court held in Ba ttl ett v. MeJ zo~
88 N\V 2n~ 518 (Mich. 1958):
~~At

common law~ unaided by statute or ordinance~
the rights of pedestrians .and motorists at crossings
"~N ere said to be equal~ It was the duty of each to exe r·cise due care. But a dis tinction 1s dra v.rn in the la. \\~ of
negligence behveen standard and amount o£ care (emphasis. by the court). A motorist tnust exercise a greater
am aunt of care than a pedestrian. The motorist has
under his control an instrumentality capable of inflicting great bodi 1y harm u pan relatively slight impact
and at slight risk to himself~ This aspect of the la.w of
negligence has not received the emphasis demanded
by its significance in the motorist-pedestrian cases. This
is one reason \V hy the common Ia w rule of reciprocal
rights and duties has not sufficed to protect pedestrians
from the hazards of ever-increasing automobile tra..ffic
Legislative bodies have sought other solutions and have
given the pedestrian the right of way at street crossings. The same ordinance is involved in this case as
was involved in Moldenhauer v. Smith} 311 Mich.
265) 18 NW 2nd 818 ( 1945). In that case, despite the
right of '"vay given the pedestrian by the ordinance,
he \Vas held to be contributorily negligent as a matter
of law. _The Molde?hauer case erroneously interpreted
the ordmance and 1s overruled. The ordinance entitles
the pedestrian to positive preferential treatment at
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crosswalks. The care required of the motorist goes
beyond the common law rule of ordinary care. 'We
do not sit to render nugatory the efforts of our people
to protect their lives and limbs. The ordinance places
upon the motorist certain affirmative duties: He must
approach a crosswalk at such moderate speed as to
be able to yield the right of way to a pedestrian crossing
therein, and he able to bring his car to a complete stopj
if necessary, to aceo rd the pedestrian his right of way.'
4

~ The

tenor of the decision in the Bartlett case is
probably best expressed by these words of the court:
·we look with horror upon ancient rites involving
human sacrifice. We take pride in our progression from
the sacrifice of the first- born son, to the Iamb~ then to
the abolition of sacrifice entirely~ yet historians of the
future may well note that it was a common sight in
our cities in this era to observe the citizens of the camp
munity running for their lives~ literally~ if caught in
the center of the street by a changing traffic light.
Those not so nimble as others perish in greater nwn~
hers. The decedent whose case is before us was. 76
years of age. Whether he was able to run or not the
record does not disclose. When asked if the decedent
began to run when the traffic started moving, as he
was leaving the center of the road~ a ~vitness replied
that ~·the first couple of steps he walked~n The next
question: ·~Did he run after that?~! A. "He speeded it
up.'~ ' Concludes the court~ '-Not, certainly, enough.:> "
Mrs. Langlois had a right to cross \vhere she did. It was
not in cum bent upon her to use the north mar ked intersection.
If it could be said tb at she should have gone there, then it
could be said that she should have walked either to ).Jorth
Temple or to South TempJe where signal lights made it even
safer to cross. The plaintiff was not contributorily negligent

and the Court erred in failing to direct a verdict in her favor.
27
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Even in the event the lower Court was right and the
plaintiff ~vas not in a marked cro5swalk as defined by Section
41 w6w8, she sti 1J 1;VO ul d haVe been entitled to recover. pedestrians
customarily crossed State Street where this accident occurred.
The defendant 'vas familiar with tha.t intersection and he had
seen people cross at that point. He kne\v pedestrians crossed
there and knew· that they might be using that a.rea at any time.
Therefore~ having that kno-\vledge, he had the dutY to drive at
that point with the same care and caution as if it were an actual
mar ked pedestrian lane.

Morgan

V~

Domino, La. App. 166

s+

208 ( 1936):

··Considering defendant~ s knowledge that the place
in question was customarily used by pedes tri.ans as a
crossing, the principle of la-w- governing motor ist.s and
pedestrians at public crossings or street in tcrsections
in the absence of statutes or ordinances is applicable.
This p ri nci pie is that motorist and the pedestrian have
equality of right in the use of the crossing, and each
must exercise such right with reasonable regard for
the sa£ etr and convenience of others ... ,
Miller v. Tiedemann) 94 A. 835, 249 Pa. 234 ( 1915):
~1t

is true Mr~ Miller was not crossing street at
the end of a block, still he was doing so at a point which
defendant~ s chauffeur knew was customarily and very
generally used for tba t pw pose.·~
The Court erred in ·not instructing the jury that the plain-

tiff had the right-of \vay. In fact, under the circumstances~ the
Court should have instructed the jury to bring jn a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant~

All the assignments of error complained of "rere preju·
dicial.
28
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CONCLUSION
This case is another illustration of the hazard of driving
an automobile during a heavy wet snowstorm. Here, the only
visibility the defendant had was through the sweep of the

windshield wi pet. His side windows, according to defendant's
own tes tirnony ~ were fogged. If the ~·indo ws were fogged the
probability is that the windshield was also fogged. When a
pedestrian comes into view from either side in circumstances
such as this~ he often appears to come suddenly~ Instead of
excusing a driver~ it only adds to the degree of care required.
Instructions No. 6 and 7 given by the Court were clear1y

erroneous. North Temple and South Temple are not adjacent
intersections any more than Salt Lake City and Sacramento are
adjacent state capitals; Cars on City intervenes. The plaintiff
bad the right-of-way+ The plaintiff did everything required
a pedestrian in crossing the street. She did not have the

of

agility of a university athlete to jump out of the way and even
a university athlete~ in this case~ would have been beset with
difficulties had he tried to escape the oncoming car. The defendant was driving too fast for existing conditions, especially .
in view of poor visibility and a h ea"'1'" ~ wet snowstorm.
Wherefore~

your appellant prays that this Court reverse

the trial Court and enter j udgm en t for the p1ain tiff.
Respectfully submitted;

RAY S+ McCARTY and
C. Vb"'RNON LANGLOIS
Attorneys fat< Plainti_ff
and Appellant
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